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ABSTRACT

The interaction between a creditor
and a sovereign debtor is described
as a ‘one-shot’ game with discrete
actions—total or no debt-repudiation
and seizure of asset holding abroad.
Possible Nash equilibria where each
player chooses an action as to
maximise his expected payoff given
his beliefs about the other player’s
action and the implications of those
actions on the players’ trustworthy
reputation are identified. However, if
reputation losses vary convexly with
the players’ relative hostility, partial
repudiation and seizure might be the
preferred strategies. The preferred
repudiation and seizure rates are
analysed under asym metric and
symmetric information about the state
of the world.

1. INTRODUCTION

Despite the renewed growth of many developing countries in Asia
and Latin America during the first half of the 1990s, the external
debt crisis is far from being over. This crisis started in August
1982 when Mexico could not service its external liabilities. Twelve
and a half years later, in January 1995, the foreign exchange
reserves of the very same country were almost halved to a mere
$3.5 billion. Mexico's default on short-term liabilities has been
prevented by a US-led rescue plan that included $50 billion of
loan guarantees. However, the crisis has destabilised the stockexchange markets in other Latin American countries and raised
the level of scepticism about the ability of those countries to
overcome their severe and prolonged external-debt problems.
During the 1990s, many of the former centrally planned
economies in East Europe have joined the club of the highly
indebted countries. By the mid 1990s, the developing countries as
a group have become more indebted than they were at any time
during the 1980s. The aggregate external debts of the developing
countries as a proportion of their combined gross domestic
product reached about 40 per cent and for many of these
countries the debt-service ratio (i.e., total interest and principal
payments as a share of exports of goods and services) was at a
crippling level (e.g., 77 per cent for Algeria, 64 per cent for Peru,
and 41 per cent for Hungary in 1993).
As suggested by the debt-overhang hypothesis, an indebted
country's investment, and consequently economic growth, might
be adversely affected by its debt-service payments through the
depletion of financial resources available for investment and
expected and actual increase in tax rates, which in the presence
of capital mobility discourages capital formation and repatriation
of flight capital (Krugman, 1989; Helpman, 1989; and Dooley
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and Helpman, 1992). This crowding-out effect of actual debt
service payments has been supported empirically by Boyce
(1992) and Cohen (1993). In view of this adverse effect, internal
pressures, and the fact that a country's public external debt is a
sovereign one and as such is not subject to incentive to repudiate
external liabilities, might be moderated by the level of its asset
holding abroad as creditors, official ones in particular, can
respond by seizing these assets. Yet, seizure is a two-edge sword
as it is also possible for an indebted country to seize the
creditors' assets holding on its soil. It has also been suggested by
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Kletzer (1984), Grossman and Van
Huyck (1988, 1993), and Dooley and Svensson (1994), with
Bulow and Rogoff's (1989) reservation for small countries facing
competitive foreign investors, and empirically supported by Lee
(1993), that a country's incentive to repudiate external liabilities
might also be moderated by a concern about the adverse effect of
a default on its trustworthy reputation and subsequently on its
access to foreign creditors.
The paper starts by analysing the strategic interaction between
a creditor and a sovereign debtor within a game-theoretic
framework whereby an indebted sovereign and a creditor decide
on their repudiation and seizure strategies simultaneously, taking
into account the implication of their actions on their trustworthy
reputation. The novelty of the analysis is that trustworthyreputation gains and losses are accruable to both players, and not
only to the indebted country, and that these gains, or losses, vary
in accordance with the nature of the interaction between the
players. That is, the description of the players' payoffs takes into
account the implications of being perceived as a villain when
acting non-cooperatively and the benefits of being perceived
righteous, or even as a victim, when playing cooperatively for
future interactions of the creditor and the indebted sovereign with
other players. For instance, in a case of repudiation, the losses for
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the creditor from not seizing the indebted country's asset holding
abroad when he could do so are moderated by the gain of
trustworthy reputation from acting cooperatively and nonaggressively toward the indebted country. These reputation gains
are likely to be larger in the event of repudiation than in the case
of debt repayment, and may significantly improve the creditor's
bargaining power in the international credit market. In such a
case, the unprovoked defaulting debtor might suffer from a
substantial loss of trustworthy reputation. Similarly, a seizure of
an indebted country's asset holding abroad, especially when the
indebted country repays its debt, can adversely affect the
trustworthy reputation of a creditor while enhancing the
trustworthy reputation of the cooperatively acting debtor.
As in any other game-theoretic analysis, the drawback of the
above approach is that the strategies available to the players are
of a discrete nature — either total repudiation of debt and seizure
of asset-holding abroad, or no repudiation and seizure. From the
players' perspectives, the optimality of such discrete actions is
questionable if their reputation losses rise convexly with the
relative hostility of their actions. Moreover, the players'
reputation losses might be affected by the state of the world at
the time the game takes place. A default of an indebted country is
likely to be more excusable when that country suffers from harsh
natural, social, political and economic conditions than when it
enjoys favourable ones. Similarly, a hostile behaviour of a creditor
toward a sovereign in distress is likely to be condemned by the
international community. These elements are incorporated into
the design of quadratic reputation loss functions which play a
key role in the expected-return maximisation analysis of the
repudiation and seizure rates under asymmetric information and,
alternatively, under symmetric information.
The analysis is organised in the following manner. Section 2
describes the strategy combinations available to the indebted
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sovereign and the creditor as zero or total repudiation and
seizure and the payoffs associated with these strategies. It then
identifies the possible Nash-equilibria in pure strategies under
various assumptions about the constituents of the players'
payoffs. Section 3 relaxes the assumption of zero-one repudiation
and seizure rates and analyses the optimal repudiation and
seizure rates associated with convex reputation loss functions,
uncertainty about the well-being of the indebted sovereign and
asymmetric information. Section 4 generates the indebted
sovereign's and the creditor's choice of repudiation and seizure
rates under the alternative assumption of symmetric information.
This section also highlights the complex effect of the probability
of a 'bad' state of world on the optimal repudiation and seizure
rates. Section V concludes the paper.
2. REPUDIATION, SEIZURE AND REPUTATION IN A 'ONESHOT' GAME

The strategies available to the indebted sovereign in the game
considered in this section are: (i) repayment of the debt, (ii)
repudiation of the debt, or (iii) both repudiation of the debt and
seizure of the creditor's asset holding in the indebted country.
Similarly, the strategies available to the creditor are: (a) no
seizure of the indebted country's asset holding in the creditor
country, or (b) seizure of these assets.
Let,
D

=

the book value of the sovereign debt,

Ad

=

the indebted country's asset-holding in the
creditor country,

Ac

=

the creditor's asset holding in the indebted
country,
4

RGd

=

the reputation gains for the indebted country from
In
1
acting cooperatively (with RG^ > RG^),

RGC

=

the reputation gains for the creditor from acting
cooperatively (with RG^ > RG™ > RC*),

RLd

=

the repudiation losses for the indebted country
from not acting cooperatively (with R L ^ > RL^j
> RL“ > R L j), and

RLC

=

the repudiation losses for the indebted country
from not acting cooperatively (with RL^ > RL™
> RL^).

Then the possible types of interaction between the indebted
sovereign and the creditor and their associated payoffs can be
formulated as displayed in the following payoff matrix where the
entries on the left-hand side indicate the indebted country's
payoffs and those on the right-hand side represent the creditor's
payoffs.
CREDITOR
(a) Not Seize

(I)

(Ad- D + RCd ),(AC+ D + RG j.)

(RGd - D ) ,( A c+ A d + D - R L ^ )

<n>
Repudiate

(Ad- R L d )>(Ac + R G C )

(-RLd ),(Ac+ A d - RL™)

(HI)
Repudiate
& Seize

(Ad+ A c - R L V
d ),(RGj)

(AAc-R L ^ ),(A d - R L c )

D
E

Repay

b

O
R

.j.

(b) Seize
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In view of the severe implications of strategies such as debt
repudiation or asset seizure on the continuation of the
relationship between the parties involved, it is reasonable to
analyse the interaction between an indebted sovereign and a
creditor (or a syndicate of creditors) within the framework of a
'one-shot' game rather than a repeated one. It is postulated that
each player chooses an action that maximises his expected
payoff given his beliefs about the other player's action and the
im plications of those actions on the players' trustworthy
reputation. This payoff-maximising behaviour, as well as the
strategies available to the players and their associated payoffs,
are considered to be common knowledge. Since the players'
constrained maximisation problems are linear in the actionprobability vector, the players can be better off by choosing pure
strategies rather than mixed ones.
The possible Nash equilibria in pure strategies can be found by
analysing the best response of each player to what he believes
would be the other player's strategy choice. The results of this
analysis are summarised by the following propositions whose
proofs are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1

If (i) RGd - D > - Rl JJ,
(iii)

(ii) RG^ - D > Ac - RLVdh,

and

1
In
RGC > Ad - R LC, then the co-operative combination of

repayment and non-seizure (I,a) is a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Proposition 2

If (i) - R L j > RGd - D,

(ii) - RLd > Ac - RLVdh,
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and

(iii) RG c > Ad - RL c , then the combination of repudiation and
non-seizure (II,a) is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 3

If (i) Ac - RLVdh > - RLd,

(ii) Ac - RLVdh > RGd - D and

(iii) RGc > Ad - RL*, then the combination (III,a) in which the
indebted sovereign repudiates his debt and seizes the creditor's
asset holding in his territory, while the creditor is refrained from
seizing the indebted sovereign asset holding abroad, is a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 4

If (i) RGd - D > - RLd,

(ii) R g J - D > Ac - RL™,

and

h
1
(iii) Ad - RLC > RGC, then the combination (I,b) in which the
indebted sovereign repays his debt and the creditor seizes the
indebted country's asset holding abroad is a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.
Proposition 5

If

(i) - R Lld > R g J - D,

(ii)

- RLd > Ac - RL™,

and

(iii) Ad - RL™ > RG™, then the combination (II,b) in which the
indebted country repudiates its debt and the creditor seizes the
indebted country's asset holding abroad is a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.
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Proposition 6
If (i) Ac - R L j > RGS - D,

(ii) Ac - RL^ > - R L j, and

(iii) Ad - RL^ > RG^, then the combination (III,b) in which the
indebted country repudiates its debt and also seizes the
creditor's assets held on its territory, while the creditor is seizing
the indebted country's asset holding abroad, is a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies.

3 . C O N V E X R E P U T A T IO N L O S S F U N C T IO N S , A S Y M M E T R IC
IN F O R M A T IO N A N D T H E O P T IM A L R E P U D IA T IO N A N D
S E IZ U R E R A T E S

The above game-theoretic analysis was based on extreme modes
of response (i.e., either complete seizure and repudiation or no
seizure and repudiation) and their associated fixed losses, or
gains, of trustworthy reputation. However, if reputation losses
vary with the relative intensity of the players' responses in a
convex way, partial repudiation and seizure can be the preferred
responses. The present section analyses the implications of such
convex reputation-loss functions where both players have already
set up their mind to play non-cooperatively. Moreover, a state-ofworld's effect is incorporated into the reputation-loss functions in
order to distinguish between a 'good' state of world and a 'bad'
one. A 'good' state of world is characterised by favourable
natural, social, political and economic conditions for the indebted
sovereign, whereas a 'bad' state of world is an alignment of
unfavourable conditions lowering the indebted sovereign's ability
to service external liabilities. Therefore, in a 'bad' state of world
repudiation of some of the external liabilities might be more
excusable and hence generating lower reputation loss than in a

'good' state of world. Similarly, official creditors might suffer
from relatively high reputation loss from seizing the asset holding
abroad of a sovereign in distress.
To simplify matters, the analysis considers the case where the
creditor's asset holding in the indebted country is negligible and
where the creditor's repudiation loss (CRL) is quadratic in the
ratio of the assets seized to the repudiated liabilities. In this
setting the creditor's reputation loss from seizing the indebted
sovereign asset holding abroad in a 'good' state of world is given
by

(1)
and in a 'bad' state of world by

where s is the seizure rate (0 < s < 1), r is the repudiation rate of
c
c
external liabilities (0 < r < 1),
> Cg > 0 are the coefficients of
the quadratic loss function in a 'good' and a 'bad' states of
world, respectively, and the ratio inside the parentheses indicates
the extent of the creditor's hostility relatively to that of the
indebted sovereign.
Similarly, it is assumed that the indebted sovereign reputation
loss (ISRL) rises with the ratio of the repudiated debt to the
seized assets as displayed by the following quadratic forms:

(3)
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in a 'good' state of world, and

ISRLfc=c"(ss)2
in a 'bad' state of world. Here, Cg >

w

> 0 are the coefficients

of the debtor's quadratic reputation-loss functions in 'good' and
'bad' states of world, respectively, reflecting that repudiation in a
'good' state of world is less excusable than in a 'bad' state of
world. The ratio inside the parentheses displays the extent of the
indebted sovereign's hostility relatively to that of the creditor.
It is also assumed that the creditor and the indebted sovereign
perceive the probability of a 'bad' state of world as a positive
scalar within the open unit interval nc and 7t<j, respectively, and
that both maximise expected net returns. It is likely that 7tc ^
as it is natural that the creditor is less informed about the
indebted country's affairs. In this case, one can argue that it is in
the interest of both the creditor and the indebted sovereign to act
immediately rather than waiting for the realisation of the state of
world. The underlying rationale is that by delaying action to the
realisation of the state of world the creditor, who is less
informed, is running the risk of losing a collateral if a 'bad' state
of world is realised, as such a delay might give the indebted
sovereign, who has the information edge, an opportunity to
liquidate and repatriate his asset holding abroad. Similarly, a
rational indebted sovereign is aware of the creditor's reluctance to
delay an action, and hence will not delay his action too. By
delaying repudiation the indebted sovereign is running the risk of
fully servicing his debt while the creditor is seizing some of his
asset holding abroad.
In view of the above arguments, the net return for the creditor
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is distributed as

1 - nc

(1-r) D + sAd - CRL|

(5)

y =
(1-r) D + sAd - CRLb

and the distribution of the indebted sovereign's net return is

(1 -s) A d - (1 - r) D - IS R L |

1 - nd

(6)
(1 -s) A d - (1 -r) D - IS R L b

7td

where the superscript e associated with the reputation loss terms
indicates the creditor's and the indebted sovereign's assessments
of their reputation loss given their expectations about the
intensity of each other's actions re and se, respectively. Assuming
that they both believe that reputation losses are generated in
accordance with the above-mentioned quadratic forms, then

(8)

(9)
and
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The maximisation of E(y) and the convexity of the creditor's
reputation-loss function imply that the creditor's optimal seizure
rate is

so . ---------- ilfD li---------- .

(11)

2[(l-jtc)Cg +7rcCb]Ad

This indicates that the optimal seizure rate:
i.

rises with the repudiation rate perceived by the creditor,

ii.

rises with the sovereign's external liabilities,

iii. declines with the indebted sovereign's asset holding abroad,
and
iv. declines with the probability of a 'bad' state of world (since
Cb > C g > 0).

Similarly, the maximisation of E(x) and the convexity of the
reputation loss functions imply that the indebted sovereign's best
choice of rate of repudiation is

r° - --------- (S6dAd>2

„

2[(l-7Td)Cg + 7tdCb]D
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•

(12)

That is, the indebted sovereign's optimal repudiation rate of
external liabilities:
i.

rises with the perceived seizure rate of his asset holding
abroad and the size of these assets,
ii. declines with the sovereign's external debt, and
iii. rises with the perceived probability of a 'bad' state of world
(since Cg >

> 0).

4. OPTIMAL REPUDIATION AND SEIZURE RATES WHEN
INFORMATION IS SYMMETRIC

While the previous section's analysis of the creditor's and the
indebted sovereign's optimal actions considered the case of
asymmetric information about the state of the world, the
following analysis considers the less likely case where the
perceptions of both the creditor and debtor about the probability
of the state of world are identical, i.e., %c =
- p, and where the
creditor and the indebted sovereign know each other's reputation
loss functions and objectives. In this case, the expectations of the
creditor and the indebted sovereign about each other's actions are
correct (i.e., re = r° and se = s°). Although not suffering from
information disadvantage about the state of the world, the
creditor still faces the risk of losing a collateral by delaying
seizure and hence can be expected to act immediately. Being
aware of the creditor's concerns and consideration, the indebted
sovereign can also be expected to act immediately and repudiate
some of the external liabilities.
The substitution of p for nc and t ij and the optimal seizure
rate (11) into the optimal repudiation rate equation (12) implies
that the optimal rate of repudiation when information is
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symmetric is given by

2[(l-p)Cg + pcJ]l/3 [(l-p)Cg + p C b F 3
D

(13)

Similarly, the substitution of p for rcc and %<j and the optimal
repudiation rate into the optimal seizure rate equation implies
that the optimal seizure rate in the case of symmetric information

2[(l-p)Cg + p C b F 3 [(l-p)Cg + Pc£]2/3
Ad

(14)

The above results indicate that under symmetric information the
optimal repudiation rate declines with the size of the sovereign's
external debt and that the optimal seizure rate declines with the
size of the indebted sovereign's asset holding abroad. The total
differentiation of the above equalities indicates further that the
effect of the probability of a 'bad' state of world on the optimal
repudiation and seizure rates is not clear a priori and depends
upon the relative size of the coefficients of the reputation loss
functions. The underlying rationale for this ambiguity is as
follows. Recalling that the optimal seizure rate rises with the
repudiation rate perceived by the creditor, which in the present
setting is equal to the optimal one, and recalling that the effect of
the probability of a 'bad' state of world perceived by the
indebted sovereign on his optimal seizure rate is positive, then the
indirect effect (i.e., through re) of the probability of a 'bad' state
of world on the creditor's optimal seizure rate is positive.
However, the direct effect of the probability of a 'bad' state of
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world (i.e., the effect of the creditor's own expectations about
this probability) on the creditor's optimal seizure rate is negative.
Thus, the full (direct plus indirect) effect of the probability of a
'bad' state of world on the optimal seizure rate can be positive,
negative or nil depending on the relative size of the coefficients of
the quadratic reputation-loss functions specified earlier.
Similarly, recall that the optimal repudiation rate rises with the
seizure rate perceived by the indebted sovereign and that when
information is symmetric the latter factor is equal to the optimal
seizure rate which was shown to be declining with the creditor's
perceived probability of a 'bad' state of world. Therefore, the
indirect effect (i.e., the effect through se) of the probability of a
'bad' state of world on the optimal repudiation rate is negative.
In contrast, the direct effect of the probability of a 'bad' state of
world (i.e., the effect of the indebted sovereign's own assessment
of this probability) on the optimal repudiation rate is positive.
Thus, the full effect of p on r° is not clear as well.
Note that when the coefficients of the creditor's and the
indebted sovereign's reputation loss function are similar in
magnitudes (i.e., both are treated similarly for non-cooperative
behaviour), the opposite direct and indirect effects stemming
from a change in the probability of a 'bad' state of world are of a
similar magnitude and hence the changes in the optimal
repudiation and seizure rates are relatively small. This point, as
well as the possibility of counter intuitive changes, is illustrated
by Table 1 which allows the probability of the 'bad' state of
world to vary from 0.1 to 0.9 while holding D = 12 billion dollars,
Ad = 2.4 billion dollars, Cg = 0.8 =

and

= 0.4 = Cg. In

this example, the optimal repudiation rate rises by only 1.76
percentage point and the optimal seizure rate declines by only
8.79 percentage points as the probability of a 'bad' state of world
hikes from 0.1 to 0.9.
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Table 1

Simulated effect of the probability of a 'bad' state of
the world with identical reputation loss' coefficients
and under symmetric information

Probability of
'bad' state of
world

Optimal
repudiation
rate

Optimal
seizure
rate

0.1000
0.3000
0.5000
0.7000
0.9000

0.0880
0.0948
0.1000
0.1036
0.1056

0.5278
0.5182
0.5000
0.4739
0.4399

Finally, let the creditor's reservation price (Pc) be defined as
the ratio of E(y) to D, then by virtue of equations 5 and 11 the
creditor's reservation price of a dollar of debt associated with s°

Pc = r - r e

(15)

which in the case of symmetric information implies

1 - 2[(l-p)Cg + pCb]1/3 [(1 - p)Cg + pCC
b]2/3
Pc =

p

.

(16)

In contrast to simple intuition, this result indicates that the
creditor's reservation price of a sovereign debt rises with the size
of the debt. Again, and as explained earlier, the full effect of the
probability of a 'bad' state of world on the creditor's reservation
price is not clear a priori.
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5. CONCLUSION

This paper analysed the interaction between the creditor and
the indebted sovereign and identified the possible Nash equilibria
in pure strategies within the framework of a 'one-shot' game. The
payoffs of the game included reputation gains and losses for the
players as their current behaviour, in conjunction with their
opponent's behaviour, might affect their future payoffs from
dealing with other lenders or borrowers in the international credit
market. It was shown that the possibility of any strategy
combination to be Nash equilibrium in pure strategies depends on
these trustworthy reputations gains and losses, the size of the
debt and the asset holding of each of the players in the other
player's country.
The introduction of convex reputation loss functions suggested
that partial repudiation and seizure of asset holding abroad
might be preferred to the total or no repudiation and seizure
strategies considered by the game. These partial repudiation and
seizure were analysed under the alternative assumptions of
asymmetric and symmetric information about the state of world.
The analysis indicated that in the case of asymmetric information
optimal seizure rate rises with the repudiation rate perceived by
the creditor and the sovereign's external liabilities and declines
with the indebted sovereign's asset holding abroad and the
probability of a 'bad' state of world. It was also found that in the
case of asymmetric information, the indebted sovereign's optimal
repudiation rate declines with the sovereign's external debt but
rises with the perceived seizure rate of his asset holding abroad,
the size of these assets and the perceived probability of a 'bad'
state of world. In the case of symmetric information, it was found
that the direct and indirect effects of the probability of a 'bad'
state of world are of opposite signs and hence their combined
effect on the repudiation and seizure rates is not clear a priori.
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A PPEN D IX

Proof o f Proposition 1: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and the
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will not seize his asset
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to repay
his debt. When the indebted sovereign repays his debt, it is
optimal for the creditor not to seize the indebted country's asset
holding abroad as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 2: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will not seize his asset
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to
repudiate. Note further that when the indebted sovereign
repudiates, it is optimal for the creditor not to seize the indebted
country's liabilities as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 3: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will not seize his asset
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to
repudiate the debt and to seize the creditor's asset held in his
territory. When the indebted sovereign repudiates and seizes, it is
optimal for the creditor not to seize the indebted country's
liabilities as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 4: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will seize his asset
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to repay
its debt. When the indebted sovereign repays his debt, it is
optimal for the creditor to seize the indebted country's liabilities
as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 5: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will seize his asset
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holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to
repudiate its debt. When the indebted sovereign defaults, it is
optimal for the creditor to seize the indebted country's liabilities
as long as inequality (iii) holds.
Proof o f Proposition 6: If the inequalities (i) and (ii) hold and if the
indebted sovereign thinks that the creditor will seize his asset
holding abroad, the indebted sovereign's best response is to
repudiate its debt and to seize the creditor's assets held in its
territory. When the indebted sovereign does so, it is optimal for
the creditor to seize the indebted country's liabilities as long as
inequality (iii) holds.
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